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AUTHOR Gunn, Bruce
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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the high output demands of the information age necessitate that higher education salary administration be shifted from political systems, where subjective evaluation makes patronage a criterion of success, to management systems which employ objective analysis to allocate remuneration according to productivity. The paper proceeds with a definition of the political system and an explanation of its operation in a university. This is followed by a discussion of how this man-centered authority structure dysfunctions in salary administration because it does not hold administrators strictly accountable for the quality of their performance. Next, the management system is defined and its functions in a collegiate organization are explored. Finally the merits of using this truth-centered authority structure, to allocate compensation to academicians, are discussed including the employment of objective data to hold all personnel strictly accountable for the quality of their work. This type of authority structure functions on the assumption that truth is sovereign over the operation of the collegiate organization. Consequently, personnel develop their special gifts and talents on the way to positions where they can maximize their contributions to the university. The text includes 49 end notes. (JB)

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SALARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS VS. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

By

Bruce Gunn
Marketing Department
College of Business
Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida 32306

HE 024 824

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SALARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS VS. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Abstract

The high output demands of the information age necessitate that salary administration be shifted from political systems, where subjective evaluation makes patronage a criterion of success, to management systems which employ objective analysis to allocate remuneration according to productivity.

Introduction

The transition from the industrial era to the information age is making it increasingly clear that there are two types of authority structures in collegiate organizations. The traditional type is called a political system in this paper. The political system is the "decision making authority structure" which functions on the assumption that administration is sovereign over the operation of the university. This paradigm is dysfunctional because it implies that administration is "the measure of all things." Blind acceptance of this man-centered paradigm will allow administrators to function as standards of judgment and/or perfection, thereby placing their competence and integrity above reproach. This misconception can make political patronage the criterion of success in a university when administrators are allowed to use subjective judgment to reward their friends and punish their enemies through salary administration.

The new authority structure, which has developed rapidly from the influx of information technology into society, is referred to as a management system. The management system is the "decision making-authority structure" which functions on the assumption that "truth" is sovereign over the operation of the

university. This truth centered-paradigm implies that people are not the best source of authority because they suffer from human frailty. It is important to understand that management systems employ measurable criteria to hold all academicians, regardless of title, accountable for their productivity. This objective assessment of personnel output is the basis for allocating remuneration to these university employees.[1]

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to contrast the dysfunctions of using political systems in salary administration with the benefits of employing management systems to allocate personnel remuneration. The paper proceeds with a definition of the political system and an explanation of its operation in a university. This is followed by a discussion of how this man centered-authority structure dysfunctions in salary administration. Next, the management system is defined and its functions in a collegiate organization explored. Then the merits of using this truth centered-authority structure, to allocate compensation to academicians, are discussed. Hopefully, the result of this effort will be to make a convincing case for shifting salary administration from political systems to management systems in higher education.

The Political System in a University

The political system is the terminology used to describe the type of decision-**making authority** structure that was employed to govern institutions of higher **education in the** agricultural and industrial ages. These universities have a hierarchical organization which provides for authoritative power to flow from the top to the bottom of the pyramid structure in order to dominate personnel. The political system establishes organizational stability with internal practices designed to maintain the status quo in the dominance orders produced by the superior-subordinate relationships in these institutions. A

serious problem is arising in the information age, which began in 1957 when Sputnik was placed in earth orbit, as bureaucrats continue to use political systems as the dominant authority structure in universities. These antiquated communication and control mechanisms are causing a collapse in pedagogical productivity as they fail to facilitate universities to adapt to rapid, accelerating technological change. The political system is defined and its dysfunctions explored in the following section.

Bureaucratic Communication and Control Mechanism

The political system is a decision making-authority structure that operates on the assumption that the right and power to govern the university is vested in a single animate object--administration. The man centered-authority structure dysfunctions as a formal communication and control mechanism because it does not hold all personnel strictly accountable for the quality of their performance. Such a condition permits self-serving administrators to give higher priority to the maintenance of the status quo, in the dominance orders of the university, than to the achievement of high productivity goals. This malpractice emanates from the paradigm for this authority structure which implies that administration is the "measure of all things." The unqualified acceptance of this paradigm allows adminis-trators to place themselves above reproach by acting as standards of judgment and/or perfection.[2] This misconcep-tion permits administrators to operate on the premise that they should be delegated the authority and responsibility for their jobs but not accountability.[3] Such an accommoda-tion is justified by the sentiment that administrators' acceptance into hierarchical positions attests to their god-like virtue.[4] This erroneous conception necessitates that administrators feign infallibility which places them in an adversarial relationship with subordinates.[5] It follows that if administrators are standards of perfection and/or judgment, then everything that goes wrong in

the collegiate organization must be the fault of subordinates. This fallacious idea relegates subordinates to a position of inferiority based on their inherent imperfection and frailty.

The absence of accountability in the political system of a university creates slack that lets this organization cater to the personalities of the power elite who control its operation.[6] These personalities can be dichotomized into "service oriented" and "self-oriented" academicians. Service-oriented administrators are motivated by a strong desire for self-esteem. They earn this self-respect by using their administrative expertise to render service to their university which adds value to its programs. Compeers and subordinates benefit when superiors use their managerial and leadership skills to raise the productivity of the university. These service-oriented administrators usually possess strong character which enables them to internalize the psychological pressure necessary to make extraordinary contributions to their institution.[7]

Self-oriented administrators are motivated by a strong desire for self-aggrandizement. Self-absorbed superiors display an irrepressible drive to achieve the power of position over others and the trappings of success, e.g., salary, privilege, prestige, etc., which communicates their status in the pecking order. These "takers" have usually not achieved exceptional performance in their careers. This is because they frequently lack the strength of character to internalize the great psychological pressure necessary for extraordinary accomplishments. Self-serving academicians, who have never achieved standards of excellence in their own vocational performance, will often seek to disguise their feelings of inadequacy by taking a position of power over others. This way they can experience the pseudo self-esteem and feelings of security that are provided by the power, in formal authority, to control the behavior of subordinates.[8] When superiors possess weak character traits it can

be anticipated that they will show a penchant for using Machiavellian tactics, e.g., deceit, duplicity, craftiness, etc., to advance their own selfish ends to the detriment of university constituents. Political educators are seldom chagrined by the use of chicanery to promote themselves at the expense of others. The self-centered mindset of these academicians encourages them to pursue their own agenda through the abuse of power in their university.

The Abuse of Power

The stewards of higher education have been lax about resisting the accretion of power into the hands of a small group of university administrators answerable to no one for the quality of their performance. Such negligence allows self-oriented administrators to resurrect a feudal order in their collegiate organization similar to the type that functioned in Europe prior to the "Magna Carta" when officials were granted absolute authority. If recorded history has taught people anything, it is that man is incapable of exercising absolute power justly.

The primary means for introducing the feudal order of a political system into a university is through strict adherence to the Scaler Principle.[9] This organizational tenet, along with unity of command, span of control, reductionism, etc., are used by superiors to dominate personnel in the university. It should be noted that the practice of placing absolute power in the chain of command of an organization has been drawn from the operation of totalitarian regimes, military corps, and private enterprises. The history of these organizations demonstrates that superiors show a strong inclination for using their absolute authority to exploit subordinates in order to advance their own selfish ends. These conditions have made the abuse of power the major problem in universities. This is particularly true when self-serving academicians get top positions in the organizational hierarchy and encourage

like kind to follow them into administration. Political educators in top university positions have difficulty attracting service-oriented personnel into the administrative hierarchy because their antithetical value systems do not mesh.

Self-oriented academicians use cronyism to take jobs in administration, for which they are not qualified, when a political system permits them to avoid being held accountable for their personal productivity. Although these self-serving academicians have credentials they usually lack the aptitude for these positions. This deception allows job qualifications to be used which simply require an understanding of the bureaucratic rules and regulations for the position, the capacity to process reams of mind-numbing clerical work, and a willingness to "go along with administrative malpractice in order to get along." Once political educators are accepted into hierarchical positions they can be expected to adopt the "modus operandi" of a bureaucrat to create the perception they have the administrative expertise for the job. This means they will likely become commanders with authoritarian styles because it is easier to tell academicians what to do than to provide "leadership by example." They can then use autocratic rule to sever the relationship between authority and accountability so that there is no way to define merit for their position. This malpractice allows them to replace managerial and leadership skills with patronage and coercive practices. These "drivers" can then pass their work down to subordinates by seeing their jobs as basically giving orders, rewarding success and punishing mistakes and failures.

Coercive Authority Structure

The use of the carrot and stick are expedient means of control that are well suited to bureaucrats who like to react without deliberation over problems. This means that educational politicians in administration can line their pockets

(e.g., promoting salaries based on status instead of productivity, remunerative deals with subordinates, perks, etc.) by using institutional resources to reward their friends (cronies, sycophants, lackeys) and punish their enemies (whistle blowers who challenge their administrative malpractice). Self-oriented administrators can reward or punish subordinates at their discretion when performance appraisals are based on personal opinion. Under these conditions it is possible for superiors to use domination, intimidation, and manipulation to establish a pecking order that keeps most subordinates in line through the fear of punishment.

Commanders get work done by using Social Darwinism in their academic units to create "free competition" for merit raises. Faculty are rewarded for "the best effort" under the normal curve syndrome irrespective of their personal circumstances. This regressive form of rivalry underscores the truism that there is nothing so unfair as the equal treatment of unequals. The "cut throat" competition can be "hyped" further with opportunities for rapid promotion through the ranks. These conditions can reduce academia to a jungle in which scared faculty compete within the university for their own survival. This is counterproduc-tive because frightened academicians often let political criteria dictate their behavior in a mercenary environment.

The use of the above hierarchical pressure to squeeze work out of faculty frequently puts these academicians into a race between job obsolescence and retirement. This is the result of encouraging academicians to sell out their long-term productivity for short-term gains in salary and rank. The problem is made acute by the feudal order of the political system which does not usually prescribe for the use of effective counseling, training, and educational programs to advance the vocational knowledge, skills, and attitudes of faculty over their careers. The subsequent "meat grinder effect" depreciates

academicians as human capital which is clearly exemplified in the problem of wage compaction for faculty in their late forties and beyond.[10] This administrative malpractice can place conscientious faculty under debilitating stress that all too often undermines their family life, health, productivity, and career potential.

Self-serving superiors can camouflage their administrative malpractice with bureaucratic procedures that are facetiously referred to as "mushroom management." This ploy can be used by bureaucrats when they are careful to eliminate objective criteria for assessing personnel performance in their university. Mushroom management provides for administrators to preserve their power by using secrecy to keep everyone in the dark as to what they know and how they are carrying out their jobs.[11] These superiors can then use the "smoke and mirrors" of gamesmanship to pile the manure on their constituents with rhetoric, innuendo, and misinformation in promoting the illusion their "zero defect" bureaucracy is working. If academicians speak out publicly about administrative malpractice they can expect to be punished with coercive practices, e.g., vetoed merit raises, promotions, grants, preferred teaching assignments, etc. The coercive authority structure operates in the chain of command of a university system when the majority of its administrators root their decisions in situation ethics.[12] This malpractice allows bureaucrats to accumulate power by settling conflicts, altercations, and grievances between superiors and subordinates in favor of administration. In the worst situation, anything short of breaking the law is considered ethical conduct for administrators in their dealings with subordinates.

Uncertainty of Situation Ethics

Bureaucrats learn quickly they can create the illusion of infallibility, beyond the fold, by replacing the certainty of moral absolutes with the

uncertainty of relative moral standards. This gives superiors the Machiavellian option of rooting their decisions along the sliding scale of situation ethics that ranges from moral, amoral to immoral dimensions.[13] Whenever traditional moral absolutes are replaced by situation ethics in a university the criterion for decision making shifts from productive efficiency to political patronage.

The above condition produces a penchant in the political system of a university for determining "truth" by a majority vote. When bureaucrats use mushroom management to obscure the variable state of veracity in their university it is easy for them to create the perception they are producing satisfactory results. This end is accomplished by using situation ethics to compromise moral, legal and/or operational standards. Such a deceitful ploy permits self-serving superiors to maintain the status quo by sweeping problems under the bureaucratic rug in order to stay in the comfort zone. Continued circumvention of moral absolutes by academicians in favor of situation ethics reinforce self-serving cliches, e.g., "The end justify the means," "To the victor belong the spoils," "Might determines right," etc. The acceptance of these sentiments ultimately makes the "law of the jungle" the standard for determining right and wrong.

Situation ethics permits university officials to pursue their own agenda to the detriment of the institution. These bureaucrats often put cronies with credentials, but not the competence and/or integrity for administration, into hierarchical positions. This self-serving practice represents a tremendous opportunity cost to a collegiate organization because it lets these academicians use clerical skills, in place of managerial and leadership talents, to earn salaries based on status. Bureaucrats who take administrative jobs, for which they are not qualified, function as parasites. This is because they consume the potential value their positions could add to the university with waste, inefficiency, mismanagement, and sometimes fraud.

These self-oriented administrators are true to their nature because they cannot stand for the "light of day" to be focused on their parasitic activity. This condition initiates frenzied efforts on their part to take cover when the lid is removed from the political system to expose their administrative malpractice. These bureaucrats coordinate efforts up and down the chain of command in the university system to punish and repress academicians who criticize their self-serving actions. Consequently, many academicians who are witnesses to this deceitful behavior simply look out for number one by adopting the three-monkey act whereby they see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil. If they do speak out against administrative malpractice, they are careful to use euphemisms, e.g., misguided, inefficient, short sighted, etc., to take the edge off this criticism. Attempts to camouflage the self-oriented behavior of administrators in an ocean of deceit will not mitigate the disastrous effects of operating a collegiate organization on a foundation of situation ethics. This is because the technological milieu of the information age, which is characterized by chronic change, will require bureaucrats to hide a rising number of problems from public view. These political educators are likely to try to mask their mistakes and failures by making an increasing number of unethical, but not necessarily illegal decisions, in an effort to create the perception their bureaucracy is working. This condition requires that a coercive authority structure be operating in the university system which can be used to intimidate academicians into not speaking out against administrative malpractice. Then as unethical decisions are increased in rapid, but imperceptible increments over a short period of time, the productivity of the university can be decimated by the rising entropy in the institution.

Therefore, when situation ethics are used by bureaucrats to inculcate high levels of incompetence into university administration, these anachronisms become

outright liabilities. This creates a condition in which the defective manage the effective in universities. The high cost of mismanagement can clearly be seen when bureaucrats are allowed to use salary administration to promote their own self-interests at the expense of university constituents.

Salary Administration with Subjective Criteria

Salary administration in the political systems of universities has covered the spectrum of approaches from guaranteed annual increments to awards based on merit and/or the discretion of superiors. Some collegiate organizations administer the salaries of academicians through a combination of across the board, discretionary, and merit allocations. However, the most common remuneration practice is probably for starting salaries to be set in universities by market conditions and then augmented with merit raises determined through performance appraisals.

Performance evaluations provide a valuable means through which administration can communicate its philosophy of personnel management. In addition, it is an important vehicle for establishing trust, transmitting decision-making authority, and giving proper recognition or constructive criticism to personnel when needed. These performance appraisals facilitate academicians to turn mistakes and failures into positive learning experiences when they are executed correctly. Unfortunately, there is a breakdown between theory and practice when performance appraisals are administered in political systems on the assumption that superiors can measure performance precisely.[14]

Theory to Practice Breakdown

The above problem is a direct consequence of not holding administrators strictly accountable for their competence and integrity in carrying out personnel appraisal duties. Apparently the belief that administrators are

standards of judgment has resulted in a situation in which few of these superiors are formally trained to evaluate their subordinates. These conditions allow the effectiveness of performance evaluations to be compromised through administrative malpractice. For example, superiors may ignore the need to use job descriptions, measurable criteria, and/or adhere to the principle of giving employees, in the same classification, equal work loads and opportunities for reward. The absence of these safeguards permits the human frailties of evaluators, e.g., leniency or harshness, halo or recency effects, central tendency, organizational uses influence, and interpersonal bias to have an adverse effect on the fidelity of the evaluation process.[15] Hence, the evaluation boils down to the subjective judgment of the superior which means the value of subordinates' contributions is in the eye of the beholder. These circumstances accentuate style over substance resulting in a situation where articulate, assertive subordinates with good people skills are favored in performance appraisal.[16] The consternation of slighted subordinates increases as they realize they have little defense against opinion based on criteria that represents some mix of patronage and productivity.[17] This arbitrary criteria facilitates self-serving superiors to accumulate power by establishing a salary-based pecking order among personnel that is greatly influenced by political patronage.[18] Consequently, some administrators despair at defending the subjective performance evaluation. They simply resort to gamesmanship, e.g., the use of a variety of rules, forms and formats, to create the illusion their appraisal system is working.

Dysfunctions from Human Frailty

The dysfunctions produced by political systems in evaluating the performance of academicians is becoming increasingly evident. For example, few if any universities governed by political systems, have introduced sound

procedures for measuring teaching effectiveness. This situation, combined with students' growing obsession with high grades to improve educational and/or employment opportunities, is compromising the integrity of the classroom. Consider that the dissemination of knowledge in the classroom requires faculty who are capable and willing to teach and students who are capable and willing to learn. The productivity of this exchange process is reduced if either party in this dyad does not do their part. The following anecdote illustrates this point. The story goes that a young lad approached Socrates with the request that he teach him. Socrates took the boy down to the sea and walked with him out into deep water. Then Socrates held the lad's head under water until he was struggling desperately for a breath of air. Socrates released the boy saying, "When your desire to learn is as strong as your desire to breathe, then and only then can I teach you."[19] The story can be used to point out that students can blame their own poor performance on academicians when there are no objective measures of teaching effectiveness being made to protect these instructors.[20] This problem can become acute when bureaucrats use student instructional surveys as a surrogate measure of teaching effectiveness.[21] Bureaucrats, whose forte is exercising clerical skills, have found these opinion surveys convenient and easy to administer. In addition, these surveys have a quantitative element which can be used to stratify teachers according to a bell curve.[22] But the deceitful use of evaluations by students and bureaucrats prompts some academicians to initiate defensive actions whereby they try to "hype" their instructional ratings by lowering performance standards in the classroom. This deception is designed to create the illusion that the teacher and students are successfully performing their classroom roles in the exchange of knowledge. Examples of these stratagems are: dumbing down tests, vocabulary and texts, curving exam grades, and using idiosyncratic instructional behavior to indicate to students

exactly what will be on quizzes. Some instructors may flag probable test questions by raising their voices and repeating the information or saying, "Listen up, you might see this again," or tell students that whenever they tap the lectern the pupils will know they are going to see that information on the exam. These students are taught to regurgitate but not think, i.e., analyze, deduce, understand consequences, and make long-range decisions. These schemes can produce relatively high grades, with minimum effort, which can create the perception of good teaching when instructional performance is measured by surveys grounded in gratuitous student opinions.

It is possible for self-oriented administrators to use salary administration to reward patronage, instead of productivity, when political systems are void of measurable criteria for assessing the value of research and publica-tion. Highly variable merit rewards can be allocated to faculty for research and publication when objective perform-ance standards are not used in the evaluation process. These conditions undermine a university's productivity in creating, organizing, and disseminating knowledge in society.

Also, mismanagement in the salary administration process allows self-serving superiors to give sycophants, cronies, and lackeys considerable preferential treatment in service assignments. Some of these cohorts receive so much favor in the form of "reward-laden" service assignments that they are virtually guaranteed merit raises before the evaluation period begins. Faculty who refuse to patronize self-absorbed superiors are assigned to mundane service duties which further undermines the potential value the university could add to the economy.

When academicians who have credentials, but not the competence and/or integrity for hierarchical positions, take administrative positions it represents a major opportunity cost to a university. These unfit administrators

are usually given life time appointments in the absence of accountability. They learn to survive in bureaucracy by functioning as educational politicians who abide by the creed of "servant to those above and master of those below." These parasitical bureaucrats use their subjective judgment in salary administration to reward sycophants, lackeys, and cronies for their slavish obedience and punish academicians who challenge their abuse of power. The waste, inefficiency, mismanagement, and sometimes fraud that is produced by administrative malpractice in university bureaucracy relegates the productive potential of the institution to a low "value added" mode of operation.

In retrospect, the inequities in salary administration that result from subjective performance appraisals are so pervasive in society that there is a strong conviction that these matters will come under the close scrutiny of federal regulatory bodies. Government agencies, e.g., the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Office of Personnel Management, while currently preoccupied with fairness of selection methodology, are shifting toward greater focus on performance appraisal abuses.[23] The transition from political systems in the industrial era to management systems in the information age will provide for objective performance data to replace subjective judgment as the basis for salary administration in higher education.

The High Output Milieu of the Information Age

Collegiate organizations are graduating from the low "value added" track of the machine age to the high "value added" orbit of the technological era. The contemporary shift from machines to high performance technology will bring about a metamorphosis in university administration. This dramatic restructuring process will provide for management systems to replace political systems as the dominant authority structures in higher education. The management system will

promote integrity in university programs to create a high trust work environment for academicians. This high trust milieu will facilitate university personnel to tap the synergistic potential of teamwork in achieving a zenith of academic productivity.

Unfortunately, the transition to management systems will not come about without strong resistance from bureaucrats who have used credentials, instead of aptitude, to crawl into the seat of position power. This is because any substantive reforms undertaken to implement management systems will weaken the grip of self-serving bureaucrats on the levers of power. These circumstances will limit bureaucrats' ability to use autocratic rule to promote their own self-aggrandizement. Hence, it can be anticipated that the power elite who control university bureaucracy will talk about changing the system. They will putter with it, rearrange it, but fight efforts to replace the political system with the management system in higher education.

The Management System in a Collegiate Organization

The management system has been evolving in organizations since the turn of the century.[24] The rapid influx of computer technology has developed management systems into cybernetic authority structures that will dominate the operation of collegiate organizations in the information age. This is because management systems are designed to facilitate universities to adapt to rapid, accelerating change in the environment. This end will be accomplished by employing measurement and exception procedures in management systems to monitor and control the activities of the university, its units, programs and personnel.[25] The use of computer technology to automate management functions will smash the organizational pyramid by eliminating middle rung bureaucratic positions in the university. This shorter chain of command will reduce the response time of the

university in meeting the changing informational needs of its constituents. In addition, these changes will thrust more personnel on the front lines of unstructured problem solving to accelerate the creation, organization, and dissemination of knowledge to these publics.

The shift in the criterion of success from patronage in political systems to productivity in management systems necessitates that power flow from the bottom to the top of the collegiate organization. This condition is based on the premise that high performance in the university requires that administrators, with managerial and leadership skills, serve the needs of academicians to successfully perform their pedagogical duties. The procedures providing for an upward flow of power can be established through a personnel contract that spells out how status is to be distributed in the collegiate organization.[26] This focus on productivity will reduce the university to a living classroom where academicians will produce a strong learning environment by serving as coaches, mentors and teachers in their areas of expertise. A discussion of how this cybernetic authority structure can be used to eliminate the dysfunctions of political systems is presented in the following sections.

Administrative Communication and Control System

The management system is a decision making-authority structure that operates on the assumption that the right and power to govern the collegiate organization is vested in a single inanimate object--truth. This truth centered-authority structure functions as a formal communication and control mechanism designed to manage the university for results.[27] The paradigm for this authority structure implies that all people suffer from human frailty. This means that the management system is no respecter of persons because it

prescribes for all personnel to be held strictly accountable for the quality of their performance.

One plausible means for holding superiors accountable for the quality of their performance is through the use of arbitration committees that operate at all levels of the organizational hierarchy. These arbitration committees are composed of unit subordinates who function as countervailing forces to administrative malpractice by performing four major duties. These duties are: (1) the regular evaluation of the superior's performance, (2) carrying out a routine operational audit, (3) executing an annual morale survey, and (4) seeing that personnel conflicts are adjudicated fairly and equitably in the unit. The latter duty reflects the tripartite design of the management system. This critical obligation provides for neutral referees (administrator, arbitrator, judge) to use moral absolutes and third wave principles to settle conflicts between countervailing parties, e.g., superiors and subordinates.[28] Subsequently, the arbitration committee is responsible for recommending and seeing to it that superiors are punished for transgressions against subordinates. Consider the case of a university Dean who was found guilty of telling personnel that "if they associated with a faculty member he did not like they would not fair well in the merit raise process."[29] In this situation the university official should have been penalized with a substantial loss of salary for violating the academic freedom of these academicians.

In some circles the tripartite management format is referred to as the "open door policy." This egalitarian arrangement for settling disputes between personnel underscores a paramount tenet in the administrative communication and control system. The tenet stipulates that the management system must encompass checks and balances designed to minimize the adverse effects of human frailty on the productivity of the university.

The administrative communication and control mechanism employs a systems science methodology in its operation. This systems methodology is comprised of participative management, management by objectives, management by exception, general systems theory, management information systems and models.[30] The synthesis of these diverse systems of action into an integrated whole produces "third wave" management principles that are clearly different from the "second wave" bureaucratic principles of the industrial age. These third wave principles produce egalitarian relationships between administrators and faculty. Although administrators are first among equals their responsibilities focus largely on strategic planning which requires faculty to pick up the slack by becoming full and equal partners in the management of their units. Administrators are responsible for using standards of excellence to push personnel up to exemplary levels of performance. This end can be accomplished over the careers of academicians by using counseling, training, and educational programs to accelerate their progress down the learning curve for their disciplines. All academicians must be given equal opportunity to gravitate to those positions where they can maximize their contribution to the university.

The computer based-management system operates on the principle of a thermostat. This feedback mechanism facilitates the university to adapt to rapid, accelerating change in its environment. The cybernetic operation of the management system is designed to elevate the performance of collegiate organizations in meeting the high "value added" demands of the technological era. There are three paramount principles which operate within the context of the cybernetic authority structure. These are the survival goal, value added standard, and true competition which will be briefly described below.

Cybernetic Authority Structure

The central parameter in the cybernetic operation of the management system is its survival goal. This target can be reduced to a quantitative rate of return coefficient for planning, analysis, and control purposes. The rate of return coefficient for the organization serves as the foundation for plans, strategies, tactics, resource allocations, priorities, and other managerial actions.[31] The reason for emphasizing this cost effective procedure concerns the fact that the amount of resources committed to universities does not determine success. The strategies pursued, the effectiveness of the organization, and efficiency in the allocation of resources are determinative.

The survival coefficient can be set originally with judgmental methods and then refined with empirical methods as a database is built up. Collegiate organizations in the public sector can adopt a rate of return coefficient, similar to what private institutions earn on their assets, as a beginning step. This rate of return coefficient, along with other critical operating variables, can be monitored continuously with computer technology. Whenever the rate of return coefficient deviates from predetermined standards, alarms and reports could alert administrators of this exception so that corrective managerial actions can be initiated to bring the variable back within prudent limits.

The above goal format will permit the units of a collegiate organization to be arranged into responsibility centers which can be assigned sub rates of return that can be synthesized back into the institution's survival coefficient.[32] Responsibility center accounting, which utilizes goal congruency for integrated control, permits cost/performance relationships to be used to squeeze waste, inefficiency, mismanagement, and fraud out of the collegiate organization. Ideally, the homeostatic survival can be maintained at a level that permits the university to maximize the value it adds to society. When this

high standard of social responsibility is met it raises the probability that the collegiate organization will be able to perpetuate its survival over time.

The survival goal is interconnected with the holistic "value added" standard. The quantitative coefficient of the survival goal measures the capital productivity within a collegiate organization while the value added standard is used to assess its external productivity.[33] This latter idea can be seen in the fact that all productive organizations function as channels of multiple exchange. The exchange of product(s), service(s), and/or idea(s), for money and/or money substitutes, takes place between collegiate organizations and their suppliers, recruiters, employees, students, contributors, government, society and, in some cases, foreign citizenry.[34] The collegiate organization lowers the entropy in the economy through fair exchanges of value with each of its publics as opposed to merely shifting value from these constituents. But the homeostatic survival coefficient is destabilized whenever resources are misallocated through the cycles of exchange between the collegiate organization and its publics. Therefore, analysis of all the cycles of exchange that impact this holistic productivity standard can be used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness with which resources are transferred between the collegiate organization and its various publics.

The above discussion of the homeostatic survival coefficient and the value added standard leads to the introduction of true competition because these concepts are related to productive efficiency. That is, when there is a shift from free competition to true competition it lowers the cost of operating organizations and the economy, thereby raising the "value added" productivity of society. True competition will be brought about in the information age by using empirical performance data to permit social entities (people, organizations, the economy) to compete against their previous accomplishments. When social

entities compete against their own performance records, within prudent delimitations, it represents the "truest" form of rivalry. The reason is because this nonsocial type of rivalry eliminates the differential advantages of combatants that cannot be compensated for by the rules of competition. True competition is the central tenet of a new ideology called competruism which is emerging in the information age.[35] This progressive form of competition can be introduced into education through management systems that employ computer-based control procedures to monitor the various outputs of social entities (collegiate organization, personnel, students).[36] A management by exception report format, which operates on the principle of a thermostat, can be used to monitor this productive activity within control channels delineated by moral, legal, and functional performance standards. Corrective action can be initiated in the management system whenever the actual variance of the variables breaks through the predetermined tolerances for their functions. Success is achieved when social entities accomplish "their best effort" which is exemplified by improvement over past performance. In sum, these three operating tenets are integral parts of the management system. The collegiate organization is characterized by integrity when its management system functions within the delimitations of Judeo-Christian ethics.

Certainty of Moral Absolutes

A high trust environment is produced in a collegiate organization when its management system operates within a framework of Judeo-Christian morality. This condition establishes an ethical culture that insulates the management system from the secular values of other authority structures and serves as the foundation of moral absolutes upon which this communication and control system functions. When the operation of the management system is bounded by

Judeo-Christian ethics it has a direct impact on shaping the character of personnel in the university.

Adherence to Judeo-Christian ethics will develop the character of personnel in a university. Academicians with strong character base their decisions on moral absolutes which produces principled behavior.[37] Conversely, individuals with weak character exemplify unprincipled behavior as a result of rooting their decisions in situation ethics. Any time decisions are based on situation ethics it introduces frailties into the collegiate organization which undermines its potential productivity.

There are three areas related to human performance where character will play a paramount role in facilitating a university to achieve high performance. First, academicians with strong character are psychologically equipped to withstand the great mental pressure necessary to convert their potential abilities into developed talent. Character is likely to be a better predictive variable of the value academicians can add to their university than their achievement scores, intelligence quotients, and grades as single factors.[38] This observation is based on the belief that character explains academicians' persistence and determination in moving down the learning curve for their discipline by solving problems that permit them to make significant contributions to their university. Certainly character facilitates academicians to cope with the cycles of success and failure, honor and humiliation, pleasure and pain, praise and criticism, approval and rejection, love and hate, popularity and alienation, etc. Academicians with weak character pursue the security, peace and harmony of the comfort zone by going along with administrative malpractice in order to get along. Therefore, the highest levels of achievement in the university will probably be attained by people who have the character to develop their full range of talents in a

self-esteem/actualization stage of motivation. This emphasis on strong character as a catalyst for personal growth, development, and achievement will be necessary in a technological era. The reason concerns the fact that post industrial societies will achieve higher returns from investments in human capital than in physical assets.[39] The development of academician's repertoire of talents (analytical, personality, creative) will provide a pinnacle in satisfaction and fulfillment because self-esteem actualization needs are thought to be insatiable when lower level needs have been gratified.[40]

Second, academicians with strong character will be able to pursue the truth with greater fidelity than personnel who promote their own selfish ends at the expense of others. Highly principled academicians use ethical standards as a plumb line to judge the rightness of policies, practices and procedures used to carry out the mission of their university. These academicians, with the strong inner voice of conscience, exhibit the courage to challenge actions that depreciate the value of human capital in the collegiate organization. This is the case even when the backlash from this moral behavior is humiliating and destructive to the academician challenging actions that result in waste, inefficiency, mismanagement and fraud. These selfless academicians accept responsibility for their own actions earning a reputation as givers, as opposed to takers, in their university. The above observations should make it clear that the higher the productivity goals of a university in the technological era, the deeper its foundation of character must be to achieve long-term success.

Third, the possession of strong character by academicians in a university will create quality relationships between personnel which is a vital condition when productive efficiency is the criterion of success. Character development raises integrity in the social exchange process, thereby increasing the potential value that can be added to the collegiate organization. This idea can

be explored by conceptualizing the exchange process as a trinity of three concentric circles composed of substance (products, services, ideas) value and trust. When a fair exchange of value takes place between trading partners, it creates trust which forms the human bonds that hold a university together. This means that the strength of a university will be in the trustworthiness of its personnel and that attribute is produced by their moral character. Thus, the strength of academicians' character will determine whether the university has the resilience to withstand the stresses and strains of an accelerating exchange process which must meet the high output demands of the technological era.

The management system provides for salary administration to serve as a means for motivating academicians to develop to their full potential in maximizing the value they add to the university through teamwork. The format for salary administration in this paper will utilize a holistic orientation which depicts work assignment, evaluation, reward, and personnel development as integral parts of the salary dispensation process.

Salary Administration with Objective Criteria

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal Employment Act of 1972 prohibits discrimination between employees on the basis of any characteristic other than productivity (quantity and quality of work).[41] However, truth requires that it be assumed in the management system that the performance of academicians cannot be measured precisely.[42] This fact can be substantiated by a perusal of faculty salary differentials on most university campuses which will reveal they are not highly correlated with contribution.[43] Administrators can monitor and measure the direct outputs of faculty, e.g., teaching loads, completed research and publications, service assignments, administra-tive duties, etc. But superiors cannot calculate the value added to

the university when an academician serves as an effective mentor to younger faculty, provides exemplary student counseling and/or introduces creative ideas into university programs, etc.

The best that can be accomplished with a sound salary administration system is to guide, motivate, reward and develop faculty toward their full vocational potential. This means that evaluation procedures, an integral part of the salary administration system, should be designed to monitor the direct outputs of academicians. The appraisal process must signal when administrators should commend faculty members for exceptional achievement or take remedial action to help these personnel overcome performance deficiencies. The adage "the first time around is ignorance but the second time around is stupidity" emphasizes that the appraisal process should not result in personnel being punished for honest mistakes. Thus, the goals of salary administration in the management system should be to facilitate personnel to develop to their full productive potential and tap the synergistic potential of teamwork.

Theory to Practice Congruency

Salary schedules, which promulgate published rewards, appear to be the fairest way to allocate remuneration in the university given that the total productivity of an academician cannot be calculated with high fidelity.[44] These salary scales promote commitment among personnel. This end is accomplished when the schedules communicate clearly where an academician is and should be in the remuneration system and the incremental compensation that can be earned for the evaluation period. This salary dispensation system rewards academicians for moving down the learning curve for their discipline which can be expected to add value to their university. This format for allocating remuneration will promote cooperation, collaboration, and group learning which is essential to the success of a university in a technological milieu.

Salary scales, which mandate automatic merit raises, are not being recommended in this treatise. In order for academicians to earn the published rewards for their position (classification, rank, seniority) on the scale, they will have to complete a satisfactory portion of the work they agreed to perform at the beginning of the evaluation period. If a faculty member's productivity falls outside the thresholds for satisfactory performance, because he/she shirked his/her responsibilities, it is plausible that he/she would earn none or only a portion of the published reward. When the principle of correlating salary with productivity is employed in higher education, it is not necessary to fire academicians for poor performance. The salary of an academician, who would not or could not satisfactorily fulfill his duties, is likely to decline to the point where it would be necessary for him to quit and seek gainful employment elsewhere.

Salary schedules are compatible with the operation of computerized performance and control systems (CPMCSs) in the cybernetic authority structure. CPMCS are objective evaluation systems that provide feedback primarily about the quantitative aspects of the work.[45] This computer technology and a management by exception (MBE) format can be used to keep personnel informed of their current performance status and provide for problems to be recognized and corrected expediently.

CPMCS can be employed by using job descriptions to identify the activities academicians will be held accountable for performing in their roles. The principle of assigning academicians in the same job classification, equal work loads and opportunity for reward should be adhered to in allocating personnel their pro rata share of activities. Then measurable goals should be set for each of the activities that the academicians are responsible for carrying out. Finally, criteria which represents the quantity and quality aspects of

productivity in achieving these activity goals, must be determined. These procedures permit CPMCS and an MBE report format to monitor and measure the direct output of academicians within control channels that are delineated by quantitative performance standards.[46] This means that the control channels for the activities are circumscribed with preestablished tolerance thresholds which require no action to be taken until these limits are breached by an exception.

The above activity goal(s) should be set through management by objectives (MBO) negotiations so each academician is required to "achieve his/her best effort," not "the best effort." Growth in value added to the university can be generated over the entire career of an academician by setting activity goals incrementally beyond his/her present capacity but within his/her potential. The MBE format will let personnel experience "true competition." This non-social form of contention allows academicians to compete against their own records to achieve personal growth instead of being pitted against other collegians in "dog-eat-dog" rivalry.

A management system has already been published which incorporates the above operating tenets into a personnel evaluation format designed to assess the direct outputs of academicians.[47] However, the critical issue in this discussion of the management system concerns the need to minimize human frailty in salary administration. This task focuses on the use of performance standards that serve as criteria for objectively measuring the productivity generated by the direct outputs of academicians.

Human Frailties Under Control

Some suggestions are offered below for developing criteria which can be used to measure the performance of academicians in carrying out their teaching, research, service, and administrative assignments. The academician's

productivity in performing these activities can be recorded on a bi modal instrument. The first column on this instrument designates the quantity criteria associated with the work assignment. This column specifies the quantity weight given each of the activities that make up the work assignment for an academician. An example of a weight scheme that could be used to depict the quantity criteria for the total work assignment of a collegian would be: teaching (40%), research (40%), service (10%), and administration (10%). The percentage weight of each classification can be broken down further by specific assignment, e.g., teaching (graduate class 25%; undergraduate class 15%), research (referred article 30%, program paper 10%), service (undergraduate policy committee 3%; student advising 7%), administration (Director, Center for Competruistic Studies 10%). Thus, this arrangement provides for the weight column to depict quantity criteria relative to the percentage of work time allocated to an activity. These percentages reflect the relative importance of each activity in the mix of projects assigned to an academician.

The second column depicts the quality criteria with a (1 to 10) proficiency scale that can be used to designate the relative value added to a university from a specific activity. This column requires that performance standards be predetermined through cost-benefit analysis. These predetermined performance standards can be used to indicate the relative contribution of an activity along the proficiency scale. This objective analysis can be compiled and shared among similar types of institutions, e.g., research designated universities.

Once the criteria is recorded on the bi modal format for an academician's work, these quantity and quality factors of productivity can then be multiplied into an output product for each activity. These output products can be summed into a composite productivity score for the collegian.[48] A more specific discussion of procedures for determining quantity and quality criteria, relative

to the major activity classifications in the work assignments of an academician, follows:

TEACHING AND LEARNING: The effort to assess the productivity of faculty teaching can begin with the chairperson assigning the quantity criteria to these activities. Empirical analysis can be used to determine the average man-hours required to teach various types of courses, e.g., standard lecture classes, seminars, directed individual study, etc., as well as preparation time for new instructional assignments. University administration may want to allocate greater man-hours to graduate classes, than to undergraduate sections, because of the more rigorous content that comprises these advanced courses. Another option would be to assign similar types of undergraduate and graduate classes the same average man-hour criteria and use a sliding scale for student enrollment to equalize the teaching workload. These quantity criteria can be used by the administrator to set the percentage of time, within the standard 40-hour week, each unit faculty member should devote to instructional duties.

Determining quality criteria for this activity is a difficult task because, at the present time, there are no methods for measuring teaching effectiveness being universally employed in higher education. One approach to measuring teaching effectiveness along a (1 to 10) proficiency scale can begin by standardizing the content in classes, e.g., foundation courses, through committee selection of textbooks. The committee can then prepare a departmental test bank. Each item in the test bank, e.g., objective questions, should be graded for difficulty so that all tests given in the course can be prepared to meet the same standards of rigor. When faculty are allowed to arbitrarily vary the rigor of course content and/or tests, it can produce a false impression of teaching effectiveness. Secretarial personnel can monitor these administrative matters to ensure the rules are followed. In fact, it may

be advisable to have the secretaries compose the exams from the relevant questions in the test bank. This procedure will help to guard against faculty "hyping" their proficiency scores by using idiosyncratic instructional behavior to indicate to students exactly what will be on the quizzes. Productivity goals which focus on learning, instead of teaching, can be set relative to the number of students that should surpass the various percentage hurdles [C (70-79%), B (80-89%), A (90-100%)] for the standardized tests in the course. Clearly, faculty should be free to use the most cost effective training methods available, e.g., lectures, video, programmed modules, case studies, simulation models, role playing, computer based instruction, etc., to achieve these predetermined goals. Although this approach leaves considerable room for improvement, it can produce a rough estimation of exceptional, acceptable, and deficient teaching proficiency. Faculty preforming at the extremes of the teaching continuum should be targeted for commendation or remedial programs, respectively. The bulk of faculty members who perform within acceptable tolerances for the quality of teaching should be given proficiency scores that can be readily defended, in the sunlight, through a comparison of peers' teaching records.

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION: The quantity criteria for this activity can be determined through an evaluation of the average man-hours required to complete various types of research projects, e.g., articles, program papers, grants, textbooks, etc. The quality criteria, designated along the (1 to 10) proficiency scale, can be determined through cost-benefit analysis of the value the project adds to the economy.[49] This cost-benefit analysis can take into consideration whether these diverse research projects are local, regional, national or international in scope. Currently, there are no functionally valid

and reliable criteria being used to assess research performance on most university campuses.

SERVICE AND CONSULTING: The quantity criteria for service and public consulting can be determined through an empirical evaluation of the average man-hours required to satisfactorily complete these assignments. The quality criteria, depicted along a (1 to 10) proficiency scale, can be determined by cost-benefit analysis of the value the project(s) add to the economy.

MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP: Administrative expertise is composed of managerial and leadership skills which are learned and innate talents, respectively. University officials must be seen as stewards who are accountable for the total productivity of their units. This means they are responsible for effective job management of subordinates which includes their individual output. In other situations, an academician may be given administrative duties concerning a program and/or project(s). In this case the academician would be held accountable for his/her quality of performance in pursuing the mission and goals associated with the administrative assignment.

The quantity criteria for administrative duties can be determined through an empirical evaluation of the average man-hours required to satisfactorily complete these assignments. The quality criteria, recorded along a (1 to 10) proficiency scale, can be determined by cost-benefit analysis of the value their productivity adds to the economy. In addition, administrators should be evaluated subjectively relative to how well they work with peers in the organizational hierarchy and by subordinates relative to the quality of their leadership and managerial skills.

Summary

This paper traces the declining productivity in higher education to the continued use of political systems as the dominant authority structure in

universities. The lid is removed from political systems to show that these formal communication and control mechanisms dysfunction because they do not hold administrators strictly accountable for the quality of their performance. This discrepancy permits bureaucrats to use credentials, instead of aptitude, to take jobs in the organizational hierarchy. Self-serving superiors can then use autocratic rule to sever the relationship between authority and accountability. This administrative malpractice permits them to replace managerial and leadership skills with patronage and coercive practices. They can then utilize subjective judgment in salary administration to reward their friends and punish their enemies. These conditions produce a high cost, low value added mode of operation in the collegiate organization.

It is essential that these political systems be replaced by management systems because capital must be employed efficiently and effectively in universities if these institutions are to maximize the value they add to the economy. Management systems will facilitate universities to achieve the high value added output demands of the information age because these formal communication and control systems are designed to operate collegiate organizations for results. However, it must be anticipated that bureaucrats in universities will fight attempts to replace political systems with management systems. This is because transition to these cybernetic authority structures will loosen bureaucrats' grip on the levers of power. So long as bureaucrats can retain position power in the organization they can pursue a personal agenda of self-aggrandizement. They accomplish this by using mushroom management to camouflage the quality of their performance with deceitful practices.

Management systems employ objective data to hold all personnel strictly accountable for the quality of their work. These cybernetic authority structures function on the assumption that truth is sovereign over the operation

of the collegiate organization. This tenet implies that all personnel suffer from human frailty and therefore performance must be pushed up in the salary administration system with standards of excellence and sound managerial and leadership skills. Honest mistakes and failures must be seen as opportunities for positive learning experiences and rectified through appropriate counseling, training, and educational programs. Personnel are encouraged to develop their special gifts and talents enroute to positions where they can maximize their contributions to the university. These cybernetic authority structures are bounded by Judeo-Christian ethics which require decisions to be rooted in moral absolutes as a prerequisite for the university to maximize the value it adds to society through its multiple exchange processes. Procrastination in introducing management systems into collegiate organizations will undermine America's competitive position in the world and threaten its survivance in the technological era.

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